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Abstract—Topology design is a critical task for the reliability,
economic operation, and resilience of distribution systems. This
paper proposes a distributionally robust optimization (DRO)
model for designing the topology of a new distribution system
facing random contingencies (e.g., imposed by natural disasters).
The proposed DRO model optimally configures the network
topology and integrates distributed generation to effectively meet
the loads. Moreover, we take into account the uncertainty of con-
tingency. Using the moment information of distribution line fail-
ures, we construct an ambiguity set of the contingency probability
distribution, and minimize the expected amount of load shedding
with regard to the worst-case distribution within the ambiguity
set. As compared with a classical robust optimization model, the
DRO model explicitly considers the contingency uncertainty and
so provides a less conservative configuration, yielding a better
out-of-sample performance. We recast the proposed model to
facilitate the column-and-constraint generation algorithm. We
demonstrate the out-of-sample performance of the proposed
approach in numerical case studies.
Index Terms—Distribution network, contingency, distribution-
ally robust optimization, power system resilience.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets
T Set of time periods.
N Set of nodes.
E Set of power lines.
B. Parameters
By Available budget for power line constructions.
Bw Available number (budget) of distributed genera-
tors for allocation.
Nz Maximum number of affected power lines during
the contingency.
cmn Construction cost of line (m,n).
φmn Resistance of the power line (m,n).
ηmn Reactance of the power line (m,n).
Kmn Upper limit of active power flow in line (m,n).
Rmn Upper limit of reactive power flow in line (m,n).
Dpnt Active power load at node n in time t.
Dqnt Reactive power load at node n in time t.
Cpn Active power capacity of substation or distributed
generation unit at node n.
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Cqn Reactive power capacity of substation or dis-
tributed generation unit at node n.
νmax Upper bound of voltage.
νmin Lower bound of voltage.
V0 Reference voltage value.
µmaxmn,t Upper bound of failure rate in line (m,n) in time
t.
τ rstmn Minimum restoration time of line (m,n) during
contingency.
C. First-stage Decision Variables
ymn Binary variable for network configuration; equals
1 if line (m,n) is constructed, 0 otherwise.
wn Binary variable; equals 1 if the distributed gener-
ation unit is placed at node n, 0 otherwise.
fmn Fictitious flow across line (m,n) for configuring
the network.
g Vector of first stage decision variables including
ymn, wn, and fmn.
β, γ Dual variables in the reformulation of the distribu-
tionally robust model.
D. Second-stage Decision Variables
pmn,t Active power flow across line (m,n) in period t.
qmn,t Reactive power flow across line (m,n) in period
t.
xpnt Active power generation at node n in period t.
xqnt Reactive power generation at node n in period t.
νnt Voltage magnitude at node n in period t.
snt Load shedding at node n in period t.
pi Dual variables in subproblem reformulation.
u Vector of second-stage decision variables including
pmn,t, qmn,t, x
p
nt, x
q
nt, νnt, and snt.
E. Random Parameter
zmn,t Bernoulli random variable; equals 0 if line (m,n)
is affected in period t, 1 otherwise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently U.S. has witnessed repeated severe power outages
due to natural disasters such as hurricane Sandy [1] and
tropical storm Irene [2]. Only between years of 2003–2012,
nearly 679 weather-related power outages happened in the
U.S. and each influenced more than 50,000 customers [3].
Unfortunately, the severity and frequency of natural disasters
have been trending upwards. For example, in the last ten years,
the U.S. has suffered from seven of the ten most costly storms
in its history [4]. The growing threat from natural disasters
calls for better planning of the power grids to improve system
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2resiliency. According to the report [5] by the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Department of
Energy, nearly 80–90% of outages in the power system occurs
along distribution systems, often leading to interruptions of
power supply to end customers. Practically, a distribution
system is operated in a radial topology so as to make the design
and protection coordination as simple as possible. Despite
its simplicity, any contingency in the distribution system can
interrupt the continuity of power supply to all customers
downstream the on-contingency area.
The distribution network planning is widely investigated in
existing literature and broadly categorized in three parts: dis-
tribution configuration planning ([6], [7]), distribution recon-
figuration and self-healing planning ([8], [9]), and distribution
reinforcement and expansion planning ([10], [11]). The main
objective of distribution configuration planning is to design
a new system to meet the demand in the most cost-effective
and reliable way. Distribution reconfiguration and self-healing
planning aim at improving or recovering of network func-
tionality by altering the topological structure of the network.
In particular, a self-healing process is brought up when a
contingency occurs in the system. Distribution reinforcement
and expansion planning involve enhancing the resilience of
the network to protect against possible damages or expanding
current facilities to increase reliability. This paper focuses
on the distribution network configuration part. As we borrow
some ideas from the self-healing and reinforcement planning
literature, we also briefly review the relevant works in these
domains.
Existing mathematical models of distribution network con-
figuration involve various design variables that usually include
the location [12] and size [13] of equipments like substations
and feeders. As the penetration of distributed generation (DG)
resources grows, the location and sizing of the DG units
has also received increasing attention in the literature (see,
e.g., [14], [15], [16], [17]). The network topology is another
important design variable (see, e.g., [18], [19], [20], [21]). [18]
proposes an optimal network topology design that minimizes
investment and variable costs associated with power losses
and reliability. [19] considers network reconfiguration and
maintains a radial network topology by ensuring that the node-
incidence matrix has non-zero determinant. [20] explicitly
incorporates the radiality constraints in the distribution system
configuration model and considers the integration of DG
units. None of the above works incorporate the possibility of
contingency occurrences in the planning stage.
Most of existing planning models in the literature incorpo-
rate contingencies in a post-outage recovery formulation that
identifies an optimal network reconfiguration and promptly
restores the system. [8] studies a comprehensive framework
for the distribution system in both normal operation and self-
healing modes. In the normal operation mode, the objective is
to minimize the operation costs. When a contingency happens,
the system enters the self-healing mode by sectionalizing the
on–outage zone into a set of self-supplied microgrids (MGs)
to pick up the maximum amount of loads. [9] develops a
systematic framework including planning and operating stages
for a smart distribution system. In the planning stage, the
goal is to construct self-sufficient MGs using various DGs and
storage units. In the operating stage, a new formulation that in-
corporates both emergency reactions and system restoration is
addressed for carrying out optimal self-healing control actions.
[22] proposes a graph-theoretic distribution system restoration
algorithm to find an optimal network reconfiguration after
multiple contingencies arise in the system, where the MGs
are modeled as virtual feeders and the distribution system is
modeled as a spanning tree. All of the above works are under
the premise that the contingencies have already been located
and then we perform system reconfiguration to enhance its
reliability. In contrast, this paper considers the stochasticity of
the contingency (e.g., caused by natural disasters).
Existing distribution reinforcement planning models con-
sider stochastic contingencies and carry out pre-event en-
hancement activities including vegetation management, pole
refurbishments, and undergrounding of power lines [1]. [10]
presents a two-stage robust optimization model for optimally
allocating DG resources and hardening lines before the upcom-
ing natural disasters. A new uncertainty set for contingency oc-
currences is developed to capture the spatial and temporal dy-
namic of hurricanes. [11] proposes a new tri-level optimization
approach to mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events
on the distribution system, with the objective of minimizing
hardening investment and the worst-case load shedding cost.
An infrastructure fragility model is exploited by considering
a time-varying uncertainty set of disastrous events. Even
though the above works adopt realistic uncertainty sets for
modeling the contingency, challenges still exist for the robust
optimization approaches. Indeed, they completely neglect the
probabilistic characteristics of the contingency. Accordingly,
the robust optimization approaches may only focus on the
worst-case contingency and yield over-conservative solutions.
To tackle these challenges, distributionally robust (DR)
models have been proposed [23]. The DR models consider
a set of probability distributions of the uncertain parameters
(termed ambiguity set) using certain statistical characteristics
(e.g., moments). Then, we search for a solution that is optimal
with respect to the worst-case probability distribution within
the ambiguity set. DR models have been applied on various
power system problems, such as unit commitment [24], reserve
scheduling [25], congestion management [26], and transmis-
sion expansion planning [27].
To the best of our knowledge, this paper conducts the first
study of DR models for distribution network configuration
when facing contingency. Our main contributions include: (a)
by incorporating the contingency probability distribution, our
DR model is able to capture the contingencies with lower
probability but high impacts, two key features of natural
disaster-induced outages; (b) we recast the DR model as a
two-stage robust optimization formulation that facilitate the
column-and-constraint generation algorithm (see Proposition
1); (c) solving the DR model yields a worst-case contingency
distribution, which can be used (e.g., in simulation models) to
examine other topology configuration/re-configuration policies
facing random contingency (see Proposition 2); (d) numerical
case studies demonstrate the better out-of-sample performance
of our DR model.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the DR formulation including the net-
work configuration, the restoration process, and the ambiguity
set of contingency probability distribution. In Section III, we
derive an equivalent reformulation and employ the column-
and-constraint generation framework to solve the problem.
Finally, in Section IV, we conduct case studies and analyze
the computational results.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We propose a distributionally robust optimization model for
a distribution network facing random contingency. The model
involves two stages. In the first stage, we form a set of radially
configured networks, each energized by a substation within the
network. In addition, we allocate a set of available DGs in the
system. Then, the contingency launches a set of disruptions
to the system to inflict damages. In the second stage, we
take restoration actions to minimize the load shedding by
rescheduling the output of substations and DGs.
A. Distribution network configuration
We plan to establish a distribution system in a new com-
munity without existing facilities. In this community, only the
locations of loads and substations are identified. It is assumed
that the substations are connected to a higher-level substation
in the grid. Let graph G = (N , E) represent the distribution
network, where N denotes the set of nodes and E denotes the
set of distribution lines that can be constructed. Also, assume
that substations are located in the set R ⊂ N . In the devised
network configuration, the distribution system consists of a set
of radial networks in the sense that each load bus is connected
to a substation directly or via other nodes. In other words, we
s
Substation Higher-level substation New lines
Fig. 1: Example of a spanning tree representation
construct a spanning forest with |R| components, each rooted
at one substation. For this purpose, we add a new higher-level
node s to graph G and connect it to all substation nodes,
i.e., nodes in R. We call the new graph G′ = (N ′, E ′). Now
constructing a spanning forest rooted in R is equivalent to
constructing a spanning tree of this new graph G′, where all
newly added lines (i.e., E ′\E) are included in the tree (see Fig.
1 for an example). To formulate the spanning tree, we employ
the single commodity formulation [28] as follows:∑
n|(s,n)∈E′
fsn = |N ′| − 1, (1a)∑
m|(m,n)∈E′
fmn −
∑
m|(n,m)∈E′
fnm = 1, ∀n ∈ N ′\s, (1b)∑
(m,n)∈E′
ymn = |N ′| − 1, (1c)
fmn ≤ (|N ′| − 1)ymn, ∀(m,n) ∈ E ′, (1d)
ymn = 1, ∀(m,n) ∈ E ′\E , (1e)
fmn ≥ 0, ymn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(m,n) ∈ E ′. (1f)
We remark that fmn does not represent the power flow
along the line (m,n). Instead, it represents fictitious flow
to mathematically guarantee that the distribution network is
radial. Constraint (1a) indicates that there must be |N ′ | − 1
arcs leaving the root node s in order to form a spanning tree.
Constraints (1b) ensure the connectivity of the spanning tree.
Constraint (1c) specifies that, in the constructed spanning tree,
the number of connected lines should be one unit less than the
number of nodes. Constraints (1d) designate that the capacity
of fictitious flow on each line should be no more than the total
number of connected lines. Constraints (1e) indicate that all
substations should be connected to the higher-level node s.
Furthermore, we consider the budget constraints on the
number of available DG units for installation and the total
construction costs, as stated in (1g) and (1h), respectively:∑
n∈N
wn ≤ Bw, (1g)∑
(m,n)∈E
cmnymn ≤ By. (1h)
B. Post-contingency restoration process
In this study, we model the whole restoration process using
a number of corrective actions to minimize the load shedding.
We adopt the well-studied linearized approximation of the
DistFlow model (see, e.g., [10], [29]) to formulate power flow
in the distribution system after the contingency. According to
this model, active and reactive power balance flows at each
bus are expressed as follows:∑
k|(n,k)∈E
pnk,t = pmn,t −Dpnt + xpnt + snt,
∀n ∈ N , ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T , (2a)∑
k|(n,k)∈E
qnk,t = qmn,t −Dqnt + xqnt,
∀n ∈ N , ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T . (2b)
According to the linearized DistFlow model, the relation-
ship of voltage level between any pair of adjacent nodes is
characterized by the following constraints:
νntymn = νmtymn − (φmnpmn,t + ηmnqmn,t)/V0,
∀m,n ∈ N|(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T . (2c)
4Moreover, the voltage level at each node should be within
a permissible range:
νmin ≤ νnt ≤ νmax, ∀n ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T . (2d)
Additionally, if line (m,n) is not constructed in the config-
uration stage or constructed but disrupted during the contin-
gency, the power flow on line (m,n) should be zero. These
restrictions are described by the following constraints:
0 ≤ pmn,t ≤ Kmnzmn,tymn, ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T , (2e)
0 ≤ qmn,t ≤ Rmnzmn,tymn, ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T . (2f)
In our proposed framework, each radial network is rooted at
a node where the substation is placed. Moreover, the DG units
can supply power not only to their neighboring loads but also
to all nodes in the connected network. The active and reactive
power capacity of the substations and DGs are described by
the following constraints:
0 ≤ xpnt ≤ Cpn, ∀n ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T , (2g)
0 ≤ xqnt ≤ Cqn, ∀n ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T , (2h)
0 ≤ xpnt ≤ wnCpn, ∀n ∈ N\R, ∀t ∈ T , (2i)
0 ≤ xqnt ≤ wnCqn, ∀n ∈ N\R, ∀t ∈ T . (2j)
Finally, the unsatisfied active demand at each node should
be no more than the active demand at that node:
0 ≤ snt ≤ Dpnt, ∀n ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T . (2k)
C. Ambiguity set of contingency
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature
to deal with the uncertainty of contingency. Stochastic pro-
gramming (SP) is well-known for modeling contingency due
to natural disasters (see, e.g., [30], [31], [32]). Using statistical
methods, SP estimates the joint probability distribution of
contingency and then generates a set of scenarios to represent
the stochastic contingency in decision making. The major
drawback of this approach is that the underlying probability
distribution often cannot be estimated accurately, and the
computational effort significantly increases as the number of
contingency scenarios increases. Robust optimization (RO) is
another well-known approach to cope with the uncertainty of
contingency (see, e.g., [10], [11]). Applied on the distribution
network configuration problem, RO identifies the most critical
contingencies by solving the following bilevel model:
max
z∈D(g)
Q(g, z) (3a)
s.t. D(g) =
{ ∑
(m,n)∈E
(1− zmn,t) ≤ Nz, ∀t ∈ T , (3b)
1− zmn,t ≤ ymn, ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T , (3c)
zmn,t+τ ≤ zmn,t, ∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀τ ≤ τ rstmn
}
, (3d)
where,
Q(g, z) = min
u∈H(g,z)
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
snt, (4a)
s.t. H(g, z) =
{
u : Constraints (2a)-(2k)
}
, (4b)
g := (y,w, f) indicates network configuration and DG al-
location decision variables, u := (p,q,xp,xq,ν, s) denotes
the post-contingency decision variables, and Q(g, z) repre-
sents the minimum load shedding for given topology g and
contingency z. Moreover, D(g) specifies the set of all possible
contingency scenarios. We assume by constraints (3b) that the
number of simultaneous line outages is bounded by Nz , which
can be calibrated based on reliability analyses of distribution
lines during contingency (see, e.g., [33]). Constraints (3c)
designate that only constructed lines can be affected, i.e., zmn,t
is set to be one whenever ymn equals zero. However, variables
zmn,t only appear in constraints (2e)–(2f), whose right-hand
sides equal zero if ymn = 0, regardless of the value of zmn,t.
Hence, we can relax constraints (3c) without loss of optimality.
Constraints (3d) model the minimum restoration time of failing
distribution lines. As discussed in Section I, the RO model
may only focus on the worst-case contingency (i.e., z ∈ D(g)
that maximizes Q(g, z) in (3a)) and yield over-conservative
topology design and/or DG allocation.
To overcome the challenges of the classical stochastic and
robust approaches, we propose a DR framework considering
a family of joint probability distributions of contingency
based on the moment information of the random parameters
(see, e.g., [23], [24], [34]). More specifically, we define the
ambiguity set as follows:
D =
{
P ∈ P
(
D(g)
)
: 0 ≤ EP[1− z] ≤ µmax
}
, (5)
where P
(
D(g)
)
consists of all probability distributions on a
sigma-field of D(g). Constraints (5) imply that the marginal
probability of each line (m,n) not working during time unit
t has an upper limit µmax. We note that, although D models
the contingency of new distribution lines, the distributional
information (e.g., µmax and D(g)) can be calibrated based
on reliability analyses of distribution lines (see, e.g., [33]).
Accordingly, we consider the following DR model:
max
P∈D
EP[Q(g, z)]. (6)
Here, instead of considering the worst-case scenario of con-
tingency as in the RO model, we consider the worst-case
distribution of contingency and the corresponding expected
load shedding. Hence, our approach, though still risk-averse,
is less conservative than the RO approach.
D. Distributionally robust optimization model
Our distributionally robust optimization model aims to find
an optimal distribution system configuration to minimize the
load shedding under random contingency:
min
g∈G
max
P∈D
EP[Q(g, z)], (7a)
s.t. G =
{
g : Constraints (1a)-(1h)
}
. (7b)
In above formulation, the objective function (7a) aims to
minimize the worst-case expected load shedding Q(g, z).
5III. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first derive reformulations of the worst-
case expectation model (6) and the DR model (7a)–(7b),
respectively. Then, we describe a solution approach based
on the column-and-constraint generation (CCG) framework.
Finally, we derive the worst-case distribution of contingency.
A. Problem reformulation
Proposition 1: For fixed g ∈ G, we have
max
P∈D
EP[Q(g, z)] = min
β≥0
max
z∈D(g)
{
Q(g, z)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
(µmaxmn,t + zmn,t − 1)βmn,t
}
,
where dual variables β are associated with constraints (5).
The proof is given in the appendix. By Proposition 1
and combining two minimizations, we obtain the following
equivalent reformulation of formulation (7a)–(7b):
min
β≥0,g∈G
max
z∈D(g)
min
u∈H(g,z)
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
snt
+
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
(µmaxmn,t + zmn,t − 1)βmn,t. (8)
Therefore, the DR model (7a)–(7b) is transformed into the
classical robust optimization problem (8).
B. Column-and-constraint generation framework
We employ the CCG framework [35] to solve the problem
(8). We describe the master problem in the rth iteration of the
CCG framework as follows:
min
β≥0,g∈G,λ,uj
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
(µmaxmn,t − 1)βmn,t + λ (9a)
s.t. λ ≥
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
sjnt +
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
zjmn,tβmn,t,
∀zj ∈ F , ∀j = 1, ..., r, (9b)
uj ∈ H(g, zj), ∀zj ∈ F , ∀j = 1, ..., r, (9c)
where F ⊆ D(g). In the CCG framework, set F is iteratively
augmented by incorporating more scenarios. Note that, the
master problem is a relaxation of the original problem, in
which the set of contingency D(g) consists of all possible
scenarios satisfying constraints (3b) (note that, as discussed in
Section II-C, we have relaxed (3c) without loss of optimality).
Therefore, solving the master problem (9a)–(9c) yields a lower
bound for that optimal value of (8). In contrast, the following
subproblem yields an upper bound:
max
z∈D(gˆ)
min
u∈H(gˆ,z)
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
snt +
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
βˆmn,tzmn,t, (10)
where decisions gˆ and βˆ are obtained from solving the master
problem (9a)–(9c). Note that (gˆ, βˆ) is feasible to the problem
(8). Hence, the optimal objective value of (10), plus constant∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E(µ
max
mn,t− 1)βˆmn,t, is an upper bound for (8).
Moreover, since the inner minimization problem of (10) is
always feasible and bounded (a trivial solution is when all
loads are shed), we take the dual of this minimization problem
with strong duality and convert the bilevel subproblem (10)
into the following single-level bilinear maximization problem:
max
z∈D(g),pi
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
βmn,tzmn,t −
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
Dpntpi
1
nt
−
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
Dqntpi
2
nt +
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
Kmnpi
3
mn,tzmn,tymn
+
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
Rmnpi
4
mn,tzmn,tymn
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N\R
wnC
p
npi
5
nt +
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N\R
wnC
q
npi
6
nt
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈R
Cpnpi
7
nt +
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈R
Cqnpi
8
nt
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
vmaxpi10nt −
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
vminpi11nt
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
Dpntpi
12
nt (11a)
s.t. pi3mn,t + pi
1
mt − pi1nt +
φmn
V0
pi9nt ≤ 0,
∀m,n ∈ N|(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T , (11b)
pi4mn,t + pi
2
mt − pi2nt +
ηmn
V0
pi9nt ≤ 0,
∀m,n ∈ N|(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T , (11c)
−pi1nt + pi5nt ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N\R, ∀t ∈ T , (11d)
−pi2nt + pi6nt ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N\R, ∀t ∈ T , (11e)
−pi1nt + pi7nt ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T , (11f)
−pi2nt + pi8nt ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T , (11g)
pi10nt − pi11nt + pi9jt −
∑
i|(n,i)∈E
pi9it ≤ 0,
j|(j, n) ∈ E , ∀n ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T , (11h)
−pi1nt + pi12nt ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T , (11i)
pi1nt, pi
2
nt, pi
9
nt are free and other variables are nonpositive,
where pi represent dual variables pertaining to constraints
(2a)–(2k). Note that bilinear terms piz in the objective function
(11a) can be linearized using the McCormick method [36],
which recasts the problem (11a)–(11i) as a mixed-integer
linear program and facilitates efficient off-the-shelf solvers
like CPLEX. The CCG framework is summarized as follows:
Step 0: Initialization. Pick an optimality gap . Set LB = −∞,
UB = +∞, set of contingencies F = Ø, and iteration index
r = 1.
Step 1: Solve the master problem (9a)–(9c), obtain the
optimal value objMP and optimal configuration decisions gˆr
and βˆ
r
, and update LB = objMP.
Step 2: Solve the subproblem (11a)–(11i), obtain the optimal
value objSP and an optimal contingency scenario zˆr. Update
UB = min{UB, objSP +∑t∈T ∑(m,n)∈E(µmaxmn,t − 1)βˆmn,t},
and F = F ∪ {zˆr}.
Step 3: If Gap = (UB − LB)/LB ≤ , then terminate and
output gˆr as an optimal solution; otherwise, update r = r+ 1
and go to the next step.
6Step 4: Create second-stage variables ur and the
corresponding constraints ur ∈ H(g, zˆr). Add them to
the master problem and go to Step 1.
An important by-product of the CCG framework is the
worst-case contingency probability distribution, which is for-
malized in the following proposition. The proof is given in the
appendix.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the CCG framework
terminates at the Rth iteration with optimal solutions
(βˆR, gˆR, λˆR, {uˆj}j=1,...,R). Then, if we resolve formulation
(9a)–(9c) with variables g and uj fixed at gˆR and uˆj ,
respectively, then the dual optimal solutions associated
with constraints (9b), denoted as {ψj}j=1,...,R, characterize
the worst-case contingency probability distribution, i.e.,
P{z = zj} = ψj , ∀j = 1, . . . , R.
IV. CASE STUDY
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we conduct
two case studies. In the first study, the distribution network
includes 33 nodes, 3 substations, and 2 DG units for allocation.
The 3 substations are located at nodes 1, 11, and 25, respec-
tively. In the second study, the system contains 69 nodes, 4
substations, and 3 DG units for allocation. The substations
are located at nodes 1, 13, 39, and 61, respectively. The
active and reactive power capacities of the DGs are assumed
to be 100KW and 50KVar, respectively. In both studies, we
consider 24 hours in the post-contingency restoration, i.e.,
T = {1, . . . , 24}. The active and reactive power loads at
each node are randomly generated from intervals [30, 200]KW
and [5, 100]KVars, respectively. The construction costs for
distribution lines are randomly generated from intervals pro-
portional to their length. Overall, the construction costs are
within the interval $[40, 100]×104. The contingency status for
distribution lines is assumed to follow independent Bernoulli
distributions with different failure probabilities that vary within
the interval [0, 0.01]. Unless stated otherwise, we set the
construction budget By and the maximum number of affected
lines Nz to be $1770×104 and 3 for the 33-node system, and
$4480 × 104 and 4 for the 69-node system, respectively. All
case studies are implemented in C++ with CPLEX 12.6 on a
computer with Intel Xeon 3.2 GHz and 8 GB memory.
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system
A. Optimal distribution network configuration
We report optimal configurations for the 33-node and the
69-node distribution systems in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively.
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Fig. 3: Optimal configuration for the 69-node distribution
system
TABLE I: Comparison of load shedding
DR model Robust model
WCD WCS Sim Time WCD WCS Sim Time
Nodes (KW) (KW) (KW) (s) (KW) (KW) (KW) (s)
33 1655 2535 1451 91 1921 2352 1648 179
69 4297 5119 3594 173 4570 4998 4014 372
We also compare our DR model with the RO model. For
comparison purposes, we fix configuration decisions obtained
by each model and then simulate the load shedding using
randomly generated contingencies. Table I reports the expected
load shedding under the worst-case contingency distribution
(WCD), the load shedding under the worst-case contingency
scenario (WCS), the out-of-sample average load shedding
under a randomly simulated contingency distribution within
D (Sim), and the computational time of both models. The
results verify that our DR approach yields lower load shedding
both under worst-case distribution and in the out-of-sample
simulations. In particular, our approach leads to 11% and
10% reduction in average load shedding in the out-of-sample
simulation and 13% and 5% reduction under the worst-
case distribution for the 33-node and 69-node distribution
systems, respectively. For the worst-case contingency scenario,
RO model triggers less load shedding, which was expected,
because RO optimizes the system configuration with respect
to the worst-case contingency scenario. In addition, the CPU
seconds taken to solve the test instances demonstrate the
efficacy of the proposed solution approach. To further verify
the efficacy, we replicate the experiments on 10 randomly
generated instances. For the 33-node system, the average and
maximum number of iterations the CCG algorithm takes to
converge are 7.6 and 12, respectively; and for the 69-node
system, the average and maximum number of iterations are
8.4 and 14, respectively.
B. On the value of optimal DG allocation
We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the value of
optimally allocating DG units in the distribution system. In
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Fig. 4: Comparisons of optimal and random DG allocation in
the 33-node distribution system
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Fig. 5: Comparisons of optimal and random DG allocation in
the 69-node distribution system
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 we compare the level of load shedding
when DG units are optimally located with the case when
DG units are randomly deployed. For “optimal DG”, we
solve the DR and RO models. For “random DG”, we first
randomly place DGs and then solve both models to configure
the distribution system. We perform the experiments for 5
times and report the average values to mitigate the randomness.
From Figs. 4 and 5, we observe that locating DGs properly can
significantly decrease the load shedding. This is because when
the distribution system is affected by contingencies, the loads
in islanded zones can be effectively picked up by the existing
DG resources. As a result, better DG allocation significantly
enhances the system resiliency.
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Fig. 6: Average load shedding under various line construction
budget and affected lines for the 33-node distribution system
C. Impact of construction and contingency budgets
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Fig. 7: Average load shedding under various line construction
budget and affected lines for the 69-node distribution system
In Figs. 6 and 7, we depict the amounts of expected load
shedding under various line construction budgets (i.e., By)
and contingency budgets (i.e., Nz). From these two figures,
we observe that load shedding reduces as By increases and
as Nz decreases, i.e., as we allow the contingency to affect
less power lines in the DR model. This is intuitive. In
addition, we observe that load shedding is sensitive to the
construction budget. For example, by increasing the budget
from $4440×104 to $4480×104 when Nz = 4 in Fig. 7, the
load shedding decreases from 5485KW to 4297KW, which
means that a 0.9% budgetary rise translates into a 21.6% load
shedding reduction. Furthermore, we observe that the impact
of construction budget is marginally diminishing. For example,
increasing the budget from $4500×104 to $4560×104 (i.e.,
by 1.3%) results in a 6.7% load shedding reduction. This
observation highlights the necessity of implementing a cost-
effective distribution configuration planning.
D. Worst-case contingency distribution
The worst-case contingency distribution for the 69-node
distribution system is reported in Table II. We select a subset
of representative scenarios to display and omit other scenarios
with smaller probability values. From this table, we observe
that the contingency probabilities for different power lines
are highly heterogeneous. This provides the system operator
a guideline on the system vulnerability and a meaningful
contingency probability distribution that can be used in other
vulnerability analyses.
TABLE II: Worst-case contingency distribution for the 69-
node system
Scenario Affected lines Probability
1 6-15,13-14,34-35,39-40 0.0031
2 5-26,6-15,12-13,38-39 0.0025
3 1-2,5-26,38-39,39-40 0.0021
4 12-13,13-14,38-39,61-62 0.0002
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: We rewrite maxP∈DEP[Q(g, z)] as:
max
P∈D
EP[Q(g, z)] = maxP
∫
D(g)
Q(g, z)dP, (12a)
s.t.
∫
D(g)
dP = 1, (12b)
8∫
D(g)
(1− zmn,t)dP ≤ µmaxmn,t,∀(m,n) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T . (12c)
The feasible region of the problem (12a)–(12c) has an interior
point. In other words, there exists a Pˆ that satisfies constraint
(12b) at equality and constraint (12c) strictly. For example,
we can set Pˆ to be the probability distribution solely supported
on the scenario that no contingency arises in the system, i.e.,
zmn,t = 1,∀(m,n) ∈ E , t ∈ T . Thus, the Slater’s condition
holds between the problem (12a)–(12c) and the following dual
formulation:
min
β≥0,γ
γ +
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
µmaxmn,tβmn,t, (13)
s.t.
γ +
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
(1− zmn,t)βmn,t ≥ Q(g, z), ∀z ∈ D(g).(14)
where γ and β are dual variables associated with constraints
(12b) and (12c), respectively. In the dual formulation, we
observe that the optimal γ should satisfy
γ = max
z∈D(g)
{
Q(g, z)−
∑
t∈T
∑
(m,n)∈E
(1− zmn,t)βmn,t
}
. (15)
Substituting γ from (15) to the objective function (13) com-
pletes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: With variables g and uj fixed at gˆR
and uˆj , respectively, we take the dual of formulation (9a)–(9c)
to obtain:
max
ψ≥0
R∑
j=1
ψj
(∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
sjnt
)
(16a)
s.t.
R∑
j=1
ψj(1− zjmn,t) ≤ µmaxmn,t,
∀t ∈ T , ∀(m,n) ∈ E , (16b)
R∑
j=1
ψj = 1. (16c)
By constraints (16b)–(16c), {ψj}j=1,...,R characterize a prob-
ability distribution supported on scenarios {zj}j=1,...,R such
that P{z = zj} = ψj , ∀j = 1, . . . , R. As the CCG framework
terminates at the Rth iteration and by the strong duality of
linear programming, formulation (16a)–(16c) is equivalent to
the worst-case expectation formulation (6), i.e., these two
formulations yield the same optimal value. It follows that
{ψj}j=1,...,R characterize the worst-case contingency proba-
bility distribution.
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